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CHOOSING THE LESSER EVIL: COMMENTS ON
BESHAROV'S "CHILD ABUSE REALITIES"
Margaret F. Brinig
Determining the degree of state intervention into intra-family
decision making requires an unhappy choice between allowing
abuse to continue or interfering with some families that would be
better left alone. Mr. Besharov introduces the possible harms asso-
ciated with the increased involvement of the state but fails to fully
comprehend the circumstances that necessitate such involvement.
Evils bracket the phenomenon discussed in Mr. Besharov's paper
and this one. The difference in our approach lies in the choice we
think is the lesser evil of the two, not that we think that either the
harms associated with state involvement or the risk of non-
intervention is a good thing. I would like to present two recent
cases to illustrate the choice society makes as it selects a family
intervention policy. I will also offer some suggestions for reducing
the unhappy effects of what Besharov perceives to be undue inter-
vention by social services into intact families.
His skepticism about the effectiveness of state intervention is
well illustrated by Calabretta v. Floyd,' a Ninth Circuit case in
which aggrieved parents sued a social worker and a police officer.
Following a call by an anonymous neighbor who said she'd heard
a child crying "No, Daddy" at 1:30 in the morning and two days
later saying "No, no, no" in the yard, a social worker was dis-
patched to the Calabretta home.2 Significantly, the caller had re-
ported that the Calabrettas were "extremely religious" and home-
schooled their children. 3 (Religious groups have complained that
state agencies have been quicker to investigate claims about their
members' parenting than they would be for less religious fami-
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 Seeid. at 810.
3 See id.
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lies.) When the social worker went to investigate four days after
the call, Mrs. Calabretta refused to allow her entry into the home. 4
The social worker did see the children behind their mother, how-
ever, and noted in her report that they did not appear to be
abused. 5 The social worker then went on vacation, and upon her
return ten days later, visited the Calabretta home accompanied by
a police officer. 6 At that point she insisted, over Mrs. Calabretta's
objection, on interviewing the children alone. She discovered that
they were occasionally disciplined using a "stick," a thin Lincoln
log.7 The social worker then asked to examine the three-year old
child's buttocks. When the twelve-year old sibling objected to
pulling down her brother's pants so that the social worker could
examine them, Mrs. Calabretta was asked to do so. 8 Although ex-
pressing objections, Mrs. Calabretta complied with the social
worker's request.9 There were no marks on the child's bottom.'0
The social worker departed after saying that it was against the law
to "hit your children with objects" and counseling Mrs. Calabretta
on other forms of discipline.'" The Calabrettas subsequently sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and
damages.' 2 The Ninth Circuit upheld the District's Court finding
that the defense would not be entitled to a plea of qualified immu-
nity. 13
The Calabretta incident raises many questions about the use
and abuse of state power exercised in an effort to protect the safety
of children. Families, particularly those who are either extremely
religious or who home-school their children seem to be the targets
of state suspicion too often, and many bring suit against the state
when undue intervention does occur.
There are, however, equally compelling illustrations of the
failure of non-intervention. My summer family law reading
brought a truly tragic case to my attention, and this one illustrates
4 See id. at 810-11.
5 See id. at 811.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Seeid. at 812.
9 See id.
'0 See id.
11' Id. at 811-12.
12 See id. at 812.
13 See id. at 817.
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the danger of not intervening before real harm is done. 14 In Lord v.
Living Bridges, the Lords approached an American adoption
agency, Living Bridges, looking to adopt Mexican children. 15 The
couple noted that because they had a history of health problems
themselves they "needed children in good health," and specifically
mentioned that they were not capable of caring for children with
"special needs."' 6 The Lords were told about a "premier" Mexican
orphanage with which Living Bridges dealt and were told that the
three girls they could adopt were "sweet and loving," "bright" and
"had not been abused."' 7 Unfortunately, most of these representa-
tions proved to be untrue. Most of the children in the orphanage
had been abused, including the three girls placed in the Lord's
custody.' 8 The orphanage had records showing that the girls were
the victims of physical abuse and, in the case of one, physical tor-
ture.19 One of the girls had intellectual impairments, possible brain
damage and psychological problems.20 Almost immediately after
placement, one of the girls showed signs of serious mental illness
requiring hospitalization. 21 Another was diagnosed with serious
emotional problems that required therapy, and two of the girls had
acted out violently.2 2 These problems cost the Lords not only
money, but also caused severe emotional distress, and, in Mr.
Lord's case, substantial cardiac problems. 23 The Lords sued the
placing agency for wrongful adoption, fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation, negligent nondisclosure, and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 24 In contrast to the
Calabretta's case, the agencies involved in the Lord's adoption had
not intervened soon enough nor investigated carefully enough. Un-
fortunately, much of the long-term damage associated with an
abusive household cannot be undone when the state postpones in-
tervention until a later stage. When children are left too long with
abusive parents, they often become un-adoptable. If the children
14 Lord v. Living Bridges, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11513 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
15 Seeid. at*4.
16 Id.




21 See id. at *5-*6.
22 See id. at *6.
23 See id.
24 See id. at *1.
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have survived, they are difficult to place in new homes due to
permanent scars resulting from the abuse. In addition, if children
grow older without appropriate parental love and guidance, they
may permanently lack the ability to create the attachments they
need to become successful adults.2 5
The ground that Mr. Besharov and I share, in addition to our
love for children, is a desire to zero in on the cases that are really
important, 26 rather than have social workers bogged down with
cases like the Calabretta's. But as we are a society prone to error, I
would rather impose the cost of mistakes on families like the
Calabrettas, who can at least sue and move on with their lives,
than on parents and children like the Lords. Hopefully, my sug-
gestions will help narrow the territory within which mistakes are
made.
Discussions of parental autonomy and child welfare often be-
gin with the following quotation from Prince v. Massachusetts:27
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of fam-
ily life which the state cannot enter. 28
Parents, then, need privacy and lack of interference to best do
their important work. In fact, as Professor Elizabeth and Dean
Robert Scott have written, they may be given this latitude in order
to reward them for performing well in what the Scotts term their
fiduciary duties. 29 None of us is a perfect parent. Even when both
25 See John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Volume One 28-29 (2d ed. 1982) (dis-
cussing the impact of familiar parental figures on early childhood behavioral develop-
ment); Richard J. Delaney & Frank R. Kunstal, Troubled Transplants: Unconventional
Strategies for Helping Disturbed Foster and Adoptive Children 7-8, 14 (1993)(discussing
the often unrecognized positive effect that foster parents have on troubled children).
26 See Douglas J. Besharov, Rights Versus Rights: The Dilemma of Child Protection,
Public Welfare, Spring 1985, at 19, 24.
27 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28 Id. at 166 (internal citations omitted).
29 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev.
2401, 2402 (1995).
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parents remain with their family, 30 we make so many errors that
we often breathe a sigh of relief when we realize that nothing bad
has happened. 31 Children "escape" from fenced yards, pull down
hot drinks we thought they could not reach and turn on kitchen a p-
pliances when we are answering the phone. Most of the time, they
are not hit by cars, burned too badly, or maimed by loss of digits.
Sometimes, even for parents who are trying hard to raise a
happy, healthy child, the worst occurs and a child is injured.32 For
instance, when I was clerking in New Jersey in 1974, my judge
heard a guilty plea from central city Hispanic parents who had lost
a child.33 The father put the gun he carried to protect himself when
transporting money from work to the bank in the linen closet. The
mother was pulling out sheets and dislodged the gun. The gun
went off when it hit the floor and killed one of their children.3
4
These parents had been neglectful, it is true, and in the process
their child suffered harm. But, in sentencing them, the judge rea-
soned that they had been punished enough. They weren't likely to
be repeat offenders with guns or other dangerous instrumentalities
that might harm their children.35
Just as Mr. Besharov, I'm concerned that many parents repeat-
edly abuse their children while the "system," despite knowledge of
the prior abuse, does nothing. Besharov has bemoaned the fate of
Lisa Izquierdo, who was tortured and eventually killed by a parent,
even though countless neighbors heard her cries and social serv-
ices had been called numerous times. 36 I have pointed out similar
30 See Ira Lupu, Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1317, 1330-32 (1994) (pointing out how one parent will often curb the excesses of
the other in two parent families); see also Margaret Brinig, From Contract to Covenant:
Beyond the Law and Economics of Family 176-77 (2000) (discussing parents' roles as
complements).
31 For a horrifying fictional account of a parent who is falsely accused of child abuse,
see Jane Hamilton, Map of the World 119, 123 (1998).
32 See N.J. Div. Of Youth and Family Serv's v. B.W., 384 A.2d 923, 924, 928 (1977)
(two of three children were killed in a matches-set fire while their mother was at a movie
with a fourth child and her boyfriend, and the children were being "baby sat" by a five-
r ar old).
See Chambers of Judge Theodore I. Botter, Law Division, Hudson CountyS 1974)(on file with author).
4 See id.
31 See id.
36 See Rachel Swarns, 3 Years After a Girl's Murder, 5 Siblings Lack Stable Homes,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1998, at Al, col.2. See generally Douglas Besharov, Combating
2092000]
210 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 8:1
problems in the case of Joshua Deshaney. 37 The legislature and the
courts have grappled with drawing the proper balance between the
need for family autonomy and the responsibility of abuse preven-
tion, as well as the degree and form of state intervention. Many
Supreme Court cases have extended procedural protections to par-
ents accused of child abuse. 38 Once child abuse has been identi-
fied, however, both Besharov and I are concerned with the over-
proceduralization that might prevent rapid state response.39 We
both remember the three seminal cases: Lassiter,40 which found a
right to counsel in some parental right termination cases; Santo-
sky, 4' which required at least a clear and convincing standard of
proof before a court could terminate parental rights; and M. L B.
v. S. L. J.,42 which guaranteed a free transcript for an indigent's
appeal from a termination decision. The Supreme Court mandated
these procedural protections after findings of horrific abuse. Both
of us find encouragement in federal legislation making child safety
the first priority as opposed to previous versions of the Social Se-
curity Act, which did not do so.43 The former Act made reunifica-
Child Abuse: Guidelines for Cooperation Between Law Enforcement and Child Protec-
tive Services 2-5 (1990) (describing the problem of children abused by parents and
caretakers already known by law enforcement authorities to be threats).
37 See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Parental Rights and The Ugly Duckling, 1
J.L. & Far. Studies 41, 56 (1999). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. Soc.
Serv's., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1989) (dealing with a child that was repeatedly returned
to an abusive parent by social services).
38 See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 37, at 55 n.62, 59 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102
(1996) (finding a right to a free transcript in an appeal of termination proceedings); San-
tosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that abuse must be found by 'clear and
convincing' evidence); Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that
a parent's right to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings is determined on a
case by case basis)).
39 See, e.g., Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association Ju-
venile Justice Standards Project: Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect § 1.1, §6.4(B)
(1977) (expressing a preference for family autonomy and "services which least interfere
with family autonomy, provided that the services are adequate to protect the child").
40 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981)
41 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
42 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996).
43 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. 2000), provides that:
(A) in determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child, as described in
this paragraph, and in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety shall
be the paramount concern;
(B) except as provided in subparagraph (D), reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve
and reunify families-
(i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for
removing the child from the child's home; and
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tion of birth parents and children the main goal,44 required lengthy
stays in foster homes that clearly are not beneficial to children, 45
and returned children to repeat abusers when all possible efforts to
rehabilitate parents had not been exhausted. Foster care, which by
its very nature prevents children from becoming attached, may it-
self contribute to such additional ills as the attachment disorder
mentioned earlier. 46 The newer legislation makes the safety of
children the paramount goal, preserving the family unit only if a
safe environment can be accomplished. 47 The balance required by
(ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's home;
(C) if continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) is de-
termined to be inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, reasonable efforts
shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency
plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement
of the child;
(D) reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) shall not
be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent juris-
diction has determined that-
(i) the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State
law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture,
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);
(ii) the parent has-
(I) committed murder (which would have been an offense under section 111 l(a) of Title
18, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the
United States) of another child of the parent;
(II) committed voluntary manslaughter (which would have been an offense under section
1112(a) of Title 18, if the offense had occurred in the special maritime or territorial ju-
risdiction of the United States) of another child of the parent;
(I1) aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such
a voluntary manslaughter; or
(IV) committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or an-
other child of the parent; or
(iii) the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily;
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670 et seq. (1980) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 670 et seq. (Supp. 2000)).
45 See Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care: In Whose Best Interest? 43 Harv. Educ. Rev.
4 (1973) (proposing new standards to limit the discretion of professionals in foster care);
John E.B. Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?
24 J. Fain. L. 149 (1985-86) (proposing a "therapeutic intervention" approach instead of
the current prosecutorial system of dealing with child abuse); Marsha Garrison, Child
Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 Geo. L.J. 1745
(1987) (proposing "realistic" child welfare reform measures).
6 See generally Richard J. Delaney & Frank R. Kunstal, National Child Welfare Re-
source Center for Management and Administration, Troubled Transplants: Unconven-
tional Strategies for Helping Disturbed Foster and Adoptive Children (1993) (giving
disturbing accounts of the difficulties in placing disturbed children in foster care).
47 The "reasonable efforts" to reunify the family, which are mandated by 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(15) will not be necessary where the child has been subjected to aggravated cir-
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the uncertainty in identifying which parents' rights should be ter-
minated shifts in the direction of making more speedy determina-
tions and, perhaps, erring on the side of caution.
Both Mr. Besharov and I are also concerned with the substan-
tive definition of abuse, although here we differ somewhat in the
content we would assign to the term. For example, my casebook
with Carl Schneider poses the question "Parents have rights; the
state has interests. What do children have?" 48 If we think of chil-
dren as akin to possessions of either parents or the state, we are
clearly selling them short.49 Statutes and cases nearly always pur-
port to place children first. 50 Most of the time, children who re-
main with their parents without intervention are in the very best
atmosphere for children. However, once parents have abused chil-
dren, I believe the presumption shifts, and intervention ought to
come more frequently. 5' The stark form of the dilemma, as I see it,
cumstances as defined by state law, including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and
sexual abuse, or where the parental rights with respect to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily. Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 101(a) reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2116-7 (West
1998). States must initiate or join proceedings to terminate parental rights when children
have been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, unless the child is being
cared for by a relative or the state documents a compelling reason for determining that
filing a termination petition would not be in the best interests of the child, or the state has
failed to provide to the child's family such services as the state deems appropriate. Id.
§ 103(a)(3) reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2118. See also Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann.
§ 40.001(5) (West Supp. 2000) (recognizing the authority of parents to direct the educa-
tion and upbringing of their children, but stating that this recognition "does not include
the provision of state social services for the rehabilitation of parents convicted of abusing
or neglecting their children").
48 Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law: Principles,
Process and Perspectives 583 q.3 (1996).
49 See, e.g., Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children's Per-
spectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11, 40 (1994) (suggesting that without a legal
concept of personhood, children have no more rights than chattel); Martha Minow,
Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1990); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and The Child as Prop-
erty, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992) (suggesting that Supreme Court jurisprudence
could lead to a conclusion that children can be controlled like property); Carol Sanger
and Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modem Times, 25
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 239 (1992) (detailing contemporary legal emancipation policies).
50 The classic examples are custody statutes. Others include different divorce stan-
dards where there are minor children. Some of the cases-particularly older ones-talk
in terms of parental rights over custody and decisionmaking. See, e.g., Smith v. Stillwell,
969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998) (considering a statute that pits "best interests" against parental
autonomy).
51 Reports chronicle the high number of repeat abuse cases, especially those ending in
fatalities. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Child Abuse Cases Draw New Attention, N.Y. Times,
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is the choice between sometimes unnecessarily interfering with pa-
rental autonomy (my choice) and sometimes mistakenly allowing
repeated abuse (Mr. Besharov's). In a mathematical sense, this is a
Type I/Type II error problem. (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Errors of Over- and Under-Inclusion in Child Abuse Inter-
vention
Mr. Besharov says that no one can know which parents will be
repeat child abusers-in other words, that the number of mistaken
"false positives" is unacceptably high. I believe there are some in-
dicia that can improve the accuracy of judgments (largely made by
social workers or law enforcement officers, but sometimes by
Jan. 1, 1988, at A5 (detailing how child abuse fatalities by repeat abusers are moving
states toward child protective services reform); Gary Langer, Saddest Tragedies of Child
Abuse: Preventable Cases, L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at 2 (lamenting the tragedy of
child fatalities at the hands of child abusers previously known to child services). See
generally Lorene Fuerbach Schaefer, Abused Children and State-Created Protection
Agencies: A Proposed Section 1983 Standard, 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1419 (1989) (pro-
posing to encourage intervention by giving reported child abuse victims an action for
damages against the state agency). See also Child Fatality Review Panel: 1993 New
York City Human Resources Admin (1995) (citing that 20 percent of the fatalities in
New York County in 1993 occurred within families that were already "clients" of human
services department).
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judges who decide whether or not to return children to their
homes). I would therefore favor the use of profiles52 that might
help identify times when the state should intervene or proceed
with termination of parental custody. These profiles focus both on
past behavior of the parent (since in most cases some abuse will
already have occurred) as opposed to mere characteristics (espe-
cially ones like the home schooling or "intensely religious" char-
acterizations of the Calabrettas). Some behaviors are particularly
predictive of repeat abuse once an incident of abuse has been
identified. For instance, various studies of abused children show
that those with parents who abuse substances are likely candidates
for repeat abuse. 53 Mr. Besharov himself pushed for termination of
parental rights where parents were addicted.54 In those circum-
stances where a behavior, or combination of behaviors, elevate the
risk of repeat abuse, I propose a shift in the burdens of proof as
follows. I would change the burden of proof from a presumption
that a mother who abuses illegal drugs during pregnancy is acting
in the best interests of the child to one that presumes that the
mother is not, and thus, the child should be removed. 55 See Table I
below for those indicia that create increased need for interve ntion.
52 Something that looks much like a profile is used to allocate custody at divorce ac-
cording to many state statutes. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §20-124.1 (Michie 2000) (es-
tablishing a set of criteria for determining a "person with a legitimate interest" in child
custody arrangements). According to Trina Grillo, psychological profiles classify parents
in mediation as "good" or "bad" risks for placement. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L.J. 1545, 1555-61 (1991). See also
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of In-
determinacy, 39 Law and Contemp. Probs. 226, 227 (1975) (detailing the many areas of
the law that contribute criteria for the resolution of child custody disputes).
53 For data demonstrating these results, see The Maltreatment of Children with Dis-
abilities and Child Maltreatment in Substance Abusing Families (1991), SIB-068, Na-
tional Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, Family Life Development Center, Cor-
nell University. Analysts have estimated that between 24-90% of all child maltreatment
reports involve substance abuse. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Tracy, Maternal Substance
Abuse: Protecting the Child, Preserving the Family, 39 Social Work 534 (1993) (detail-
ing studies showing a correlation between child maltreatment and substance abuse); St e-
phen Magura & Alexandre B. Laudet, Parental Substance Abuse and Child Maltreat-
ment: Review and Implications for Intervention, 18 Children and Youth Servs. Rev. 193,
194-220 (1996) (same).
54 See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Children Deserve Chance To Live, The Orlando
Sentinel, Dec. 22, 1996, at Gi; Douglas J. Besharov, The Children of Crack: Will We
Protect Them? 47 Public Welfare 6, 7-11(1989).
55 Cf. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (dealing with a trou-
bling case in which a post-viability pregnant cocaine-addicted mother was hospitalized
involuntarily for the duration of her pregnancy).
2000] Commentary
Table I. Indicia for Burden Shifting
* Abuse + parental alcohol or drug abuse;
" Abuse + boyfriend/girlfriend/stepparent (non-
adoptive) in the home;
* Abuse + child is disabled (widen abuse to non-
provision of medical care);
" Serious abuse of another sibling;
* Abuse of the other parent.
A number of studies, including those of Martin Daly and
Margo Wilson, 56 have found that children are at greater risk when
a non-related adult is living in the home. 57 Special attention should
be paid when children are "disciplined" in these homes.58 Some
research indicates that children who are disabled are at much
greater risk for abuse by parents.59 For disabled children, I would
56 See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, 8 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. _ (2000).
57 See, e.g., Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Liv-
ing with Both Parents, 6 Ethology & Sociobiology 197, 205 (1985) (estimating that pre-
schoolers living with a stepparent are forty times more likely to be abused than similarly-
aged children living with their natural parents); Joy L. Lightcap et al., Child Abuse: A
Test of Some Predictions from Evolutionary Theory, 3 Ethology & Sociobiology 61, 62
(1982) (finding that stepparents are more likely to abuse stepchildren than natural chil-
dren); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Violence Against Stepchildren, 5 Current Direc-
tions in Psychological Science 77, 80 (1996) (examining data from foreign countries that
indicate a higher rate of child abuse by stepparents); Robert Whelan, Broken Homes and
Battered Children (1993). See generally Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law:
A Model for Analysis and its Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1117 (1997)
Sexamining the biology of family relations and its bearing on child abuse policy).
See, e.g., Steve Vogel, Woman Convicted of Abusing Boy, 5, Wash. Post, Nov. 15,
1997, at B 1 (reporting the case of a non-parental girlfriend who imprisoned and abused
the five-year-old son of her boyfriend).
59 The exception is Brinig & Buckley, supra note 37, at 50-53 (utilizing empirical
work using the Cornell data). Other studies include William N. Friedrich & Allison J.
Einbender, The Abused Child: A Psychological Review, 12 J. Clinical Child Psych. 244,
244-56 (1983) (citing higher rates of abuse among disabled children); Lawrence E.
Frisch & Frances A. Thoads, Child Abuse and Neglect in Children Referred for Learning
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intervene earlier, and "second guess" medical care decisions if the
parents are reluctant to provide routine or life-saving medical
treatment. 60
This need to shift the presumption in those instances when
abuse has occurred is reflected in federal legislation.61 When there
has already been abuse of a sibling, the federal legislation changes
the presumption of reunification to one of termination.62 The
American Law Institute has also debated the merits of including
similar language in its child custody standards when a parent was
subject to abuse during childhood.63 There is some evidence that a
parent abused as a child is likely to continue the pattern of abuse
on a new generation. 64
Is Mr. Besharov correct that the categories of abuse are over-
Evaluation, 15 J. of Learning Disabilities 583 (1982) (finding that three times the ex-
pected number of abused children are found in a learning disabled population in Hawaii);
Elizabeth Krents et al., Child Abuse and the Disabled Child: Perspectives for Parents, 89
The Volta Rev. 78, 83 (1987) (citing specific reasons why disabled children are more
vulnerable to child abuse); William A. Friedrich & Jerry A. Boriskin, The Role of the
Child in Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 46 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry. 580, 583-84
(1987) (reporting that 25% to 55% of children in various studies of abused children were
classified as mentally retarded); Roger White et al., Physical Disabilities as Risk Factors
for Child Maltreatment: A Selected Review, 57 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 93, 96 (1987)
(arguing that disabled children heighten family stress, leading to a greater likelihood of
being victims of abuse). See generally Sharon R. Morgan, Abuse and Neglect of Handi-
capped Children (1987) (giving a detailed analysis of why handicapped children are
abused and by whom); Robert E. Emery & Lisa Laurman-Billings, An Overview of the
Nature, Causes and Consequences of Abusive Family Relationships: Toward Differenti-
ating Maltreatment and Violence, 53 Am. Psychologist 121, 126 (1998) (asserting that
family situations such as having a handicapped child can create stress in family relation-
ships that lead to abuse).
60 See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (involving a pa-
rental decision not to perform heart surgery on child with Down's Syndrome); In re K.I.,
B.I. and D.M., 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. 1999) (involving a premature baby with serious
medical problems that was seriously neglected by his mother).
61 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(B), the text of which appears supra note 42.
62 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D)(2), supra note 42. See also the case of Dorothy
Rose in Schneider and Brinig, supra note 48, at 804-810 (detailing the investigation into
parental abuse of a child's siblings in order to shift presumption of custody to one of
termination). See generally, Santosky et al. v. Kramer, 45 U.S. 745 (1982) (removing
two children from family after a neglect finding for the third); In re Adoption No. 12612,
725 A.2d 1037 (Md. 1999) (considering the murder of one child in a custody dispute for
another child).
63 See American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations, §2.13 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998).
64 See Murray A. Strauss, et al., Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American
Family 109 (1980).
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inclusive and thus contribute to excessive state intervention? Per-
haps. But with the Supreme Court's emphasis on procedural due
process for parents who are accused of child abuse or who face
termination of their rights, coupled with the recent federal stan-
dards mandating quick action in these cases, the harm seems
minimal when compared with the alternatives. Again, adopting a
more restrictive policy of intervention places the risk of error on a
child who might be left with abusive parents, who may face pro-
longed stay in foster care,65 or who may confront a return to an
abusive home. These harms seem more substantial, especially if
we can increase the accuracy of intervention approaches.
It is possible to achieve a balance between protection and pa-
rental independence. One attempt to reduce both the evils of over-
intervention and the evils of excessive restraint, while still main-
taining the healthy autonomy of parents, can be seen in Texas leg-
islation.66 The definitions section of the Texas Human Resources
Code includes the following provision for family preservation:
"Family preservation includes the protection of parents and their
children from needless family disruption because of unfounded
accusations of child abuse or neglect. It does not include the provi-
sion of state social services for the rehabilitation of parents con-
victed of abusing or neglecting their children." 67 Further, the state
agency is charged with providing services that "respect the fun-
damental right of parents to control the education and upbringing
of their children .. ."68
Both Professor Besharov and I (and, presumably, most of
those who have thought about the problem) would have the area
occupied by abusers and the occasions of family interventions cor-
respond exactly. The world being what it is, we cannot do so.
Curtailing definitions of abuse does not help parents or children.
65 This may be changing. For a recent case stating that parental rights termination
doesn't require proof of reunification efforts, see In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674 (1999)
(terminating parental rights of a mentally impaired woman with two daughters).
t See Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 40.001(5) (West Supp. 1999-2000).
67 Id. Presumably Besharov's view, and to some extent this statute, would correspond
with the position of Michael Wald, as stated in his article, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1025
(1975) ("any intervention that requires a child to tell the story of what happened to
authorities may cause more trauma than parental behavior").
68 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 40.002 (2)(b)(2).
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Parents seem infinitely inventive in abusing their children, 69 and
abuse often escalates. Thus, even if it is not obvious at the first
sign of abuse that the parent will be a repeat offender, steps must
be taken to ensure that the child will not be seriously damaged by
remaining in an abusive atmosphere.
In conclusion, Mr. Besharov and I present two different as-
pects of the same picture. The problem stems from society's in-
ability to accurately predict behavior in combination with the con-
flicting rights and needs of parents and children. Besharov chooses
to protect parental autonomy and, in so doing, hopes to benefit the
majority. In contrast, I choose to protect child-victims. Rather than
limiting the degree of intervention and placing children at risk of
further abuse, I offer suggestions for reducing the incidence of er-
ror in intervention decisions.
69 See, e.g., In re Alyne E., 448 N.Y.S.2d 984 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (finding the fail-
ure to aid a psychologically disturbed adolescent to be abuse); In re Shane T., 453
N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1982) (finding that a father who repeatedly called his son
derogatory terms indicating that the boy was gay was guilty of verbal abuse); State v.
Payne, 240 Conn. 766, (1997) (involving an emotional abuse case where accused party,
who was not the parent, forced young boys to urinate into a cup); Cheseborough v. State,
255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971) (considering whether parents who demonstrated how babies
were made to their young son were guilty of abuse).
